Uncertainty surrounds the choice of instruments that internalise fossil fuel pollution at the local, regional and global level. This work outlines the considerable growth in the Western Australian (WA) energy sector and explores the available options and potential hazards of using specific instruments to internalise externalities. These core options are discussed with respect to liberalising energy markets, providing private investment certainty, and imparting commentary on the developments and consequences of reform in the WA context. As a large energy exporter, providing certainty for the WA energy sector investment and the community is necessary to maintain the current prosperity. Remarkably, in the decades of market reform progress, the absence of one essential element is evident: economic externalities. Policymakers are under increasing pressure to understand economic reform, new energy markets and the multifaceted repercussions they entail. With modern energy reform sitting squarely within the milieu of more efficient governments and climate policy, there are clear economic advantages to internalising negative and positive externalities and other market distortions during energy market developments. Ignoring market failures when commercialising governmentowned energy utilities in de-regulated and competitive markets invites continued ad-hoc government interference that generates investment uncertainty in addition to a perplexed electorate.
Introduction
As externalities are a form of market failure, government interventions are justified in order to minimise their distortionary market influence and impact on the community (Gregory Mankiw et al., 2000; Foxon et al., 2005; Jaffe et al., 2005) . The recent Western Australian (WA) gas crisis caused by the June 3 explosion at Varanus Island was an example of such an intervention. Lack of long-term energy supply security planning in the WA energy development decisions lead to this single mishap cutting State gas supplies by one-third.
While technically not defined as an externality, energy supply security issues distort energy markets in a similar manner to externalities and should also be incorporated into energy market restructuring (Owen, 2004; Garnaut, 2008) .
At this point in time, a policymaker should not be surprised by a lack of consensus with currently available research findings on externality estimates and should be mindful that externality studies provide limited guidance (Sundqvist, 2004) . The resolution of external cost estimates available are often coarse and policymakers should tread carefully when navigating towards achieving specific policy outcomes. Nonetheless, the implementation of a sound internalisation strategy requires a scientifically robust and comprehensive quantification of external costs (Krewitt, 2002) . There are several reasonable explanations of discrepancies among the results of externality studies including differences in fuel characteristics, variable regulatory frameworks, inconsistent research methods, different study scopes, and the basic assumptions of the research (Sundqvist, 2004) . For example, it is currently common to omit external costs such as climate change or nuclear proliferation. While difficult to quantify, these issues have the potential to become large external costs, and therefore should not be neglected in energy policy risk assessments (Eyre, 1997) . This work aims to present available energy policy instruments that attempt to internalise negative externalities and characterise the most useful and problematic components to policymakers in the context of the WA energy sector.
Including externalities and other distortionary influences into the design of competitive energy markets is a logical evolution of the responsibility governments have to their constituents. Private investors are understandably not lining up to invest in non-excludable and non-rival public goods, such as clean air that can be acquired for free (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . Governments must therefore be responsible for introducing value to public goods by internalising market failures (Künzli et al., 2000; Sundqvist, 2004) . The milliondollar question is: can policy strategies be developed and delivered that adequately protect public goods while enhancing the efficiency of competitive markets in a politically elegant manner? (Longo and Markandya, 2005) .
Historically, regulation has formed the backbone of mechanisms for maintaining the quality of the environment. Regulation involves the imposition of standards or bans regarding emission and discharges, products or processes through licensing and monitoring (Owen, 2004) . Regulatory measures to internalise externalities involves passing a law or issuing an administrative order banning certain practices and prescribing others, which frequently become politically divisive (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . Government responses to issues such as energy supply security concerns and local environmental pollution have been influenced by various social and health crises for centuries.
One example is the banning of coal burning in London in 1352 (Owen, 2004) .
While these extreme interventions in the event of crises are often politically abrupt, although necessary in the short-term, these wider impacts of these crises are often preventable. More flexible energy sector regulatory techniques include mandatory minimum standards on the adoption of low emission technologies, energy efficiency measures for buildings, and restricted natural resource management practices (Owen, 2004) . However, where cleaner and more efficient technologies are available it is difficult to justify that excluding the worst performing and most damaging technologies will reduce economic efficiency (Diesendorf, 2007) .
The use of "command and control" regulations are often said to be less efficient than economic measures, although this simplistic view disregards the predictable, administratively simple, and clear planning frameworks that standards and regulation provide (Eyre, 1997) . In reality, a precise distinction cannot be made between market and regulatory instruments as all market-based instruments exist in a regulatory and institutional setting (Diesendorf, 2007) . In Australia, all of the most prominent competitive energy markets have major regulatory components, including the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET), the National Electricity Market (NEM), and the WA Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM) (International Energy Agency, 2001; Australian Greenhouse Office, 2003; Stewart, 2004; Western Australian Government Gazette, 2004; Independent Market Operator (Western Australia), 2006; Kent and Mercer, 2006; Outhred, 2007) .
A major attraction of economic instruments is the potentially minor government involvement and the efficiency and flexibility they can provide to private firms.
However, this potential depends on the appropriateness of the instrument for the unique conditions in individual markets (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . Marketbased economic instruments have been in use by the 1970s, and are designed to address market distortions with a mix of regulatory, economic, fiscal and financial incentives (Diesendorf, 2007) . Two strengths of market-based economic measures are their economy-wide scope and compatibility with other measures (MacGill et al., 2006) . Economic instruments allow a reduction in the overall costs of pollution mitigation to industry, creating a financial incentive for firms to continually decrease pollution and allow state governments to raise funds that can be used to finance cleaning up pollution or to replace existing taxes and subsidies (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . However, even amongst neoclassical economists, no unanimity exists on how to remedy the external effects of market transactions (Antheaume, 2004) .
When policymakers choose the instruments to internalise the externalities in the energy sector, they must strive to find a solution that gives the best outcome in terms of: efficiency; cost minimisation; impact on the job market; security of energy supply; equity of the instrument; time-based closed-ended commitments; administrative ease; intellectual property innovation; certainty of the level of internalisation, and; equity of the instrument. Governments must also continually review the outcome of such solutions (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . It is also important to acknowledge the limitations of externality methodologies to identify an optimal level of policy intervention (Krewitt, 2002) . While there are many assumptions and limitations involved in full external cost accounting methods and instruments, making use of them is preferable to ignoring such costs (Antheaume, 2004) .
Using precautionary principals and a knowledge of the strength and weaknesses of externality estimation methodologies allow policymakers to balance investment outcomes and navigate the spectrum of available polices that internalise energy pollution and other external costs. These decisions involve high political risk in WA, as the economy is highly dependent on energy and energy intensive exports. The WA energy sector provides a useful microcosm for studying the possible options and consequences of competitive energy market development with significant political, economic, social and environmental stakes for the Australian nation and the wider Pacific region.
WA: major energy user and exporter policymaking
With a population of slightly over 2 million, the state of Western Australia produces and uses a disproportionately large amount of energy. Politically, energy reform in a small state with large energy industries can be a hazardous exercise, depending on the reform agenda. To appreciate the magnitude of the highly charged reforms undertaken in WA, the author has provided a snapshot of the energy industry trends in terms of production and value. WA exports over 50% of the total primary energy produced (See Fig. 1 , 2007) . With the current gas crisis reducing the gas output by one third, the loss of income and the follow-on economic impact is likely to be considerable. The WA Chamber of Commerce and Industry received 83 responses from their member businesses in the month after the crisis and found that 14% already have or will be shutting down if the crisis lasts three months (Pearson, 2008b; Rodgers, 2008) . As full gas supplies are expected to be restored from Varanus Island after November, the WA Chamber of Commerce and Industry has stated that "every molecule of gas saved by not being burned to generate electricity, heat homes, heat water or to cook is a molecule of gas that could be made available to businesses and industry that are struggling to keep their doors open and their workers in a job" (Pearson, 2008a) .
As several mining companies and exporters have also been forced to scale-back production, this is a significant blow to the WA economy. The crisis underscores the importance of including externalities and market distortionary factors into market reform and strategic planning as a form of adaptive insurance (Kane and Shogren, 2000) . With the costs to businesses in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars every week, the introduction of a market value to measures that increase energy security and diversify energy supplies appear politically sensible (Lovelle, 2008) . The growing number of employees and economic dependence on energy and energy intensive industries adds additional political elements to undertaking market reforms. The total number of WA employees involved in coal, oil and gas extraction, electricity and gas supply and petroleum refining industries have increased over 75% in recent years (See Fig. 2 ). . These large employment, production and export figures presents major challenges to any restructuring of the energy and resources sector, especially to a region with such a relatively small populace (Peterson and Rose, 2006) .
Energy sector reform to date
Despite the enormity and political acuteness of the task, the Commonwealth and WA State Government have undertaken a range of alterations to energy markets. The reform of the domestic natural gas industry can be traced to the Natural Gas Strategy adopted by the Commonwealth Government in 1991. The strategy promoted: non-discriminatory open access to pipelines; a light-handed approach to regulation; intensified interstate trade through removal of regulatory barriers, and; infrastructure interconnection (International Energy Agency, 2001 ). Another significant change was a federally appointed inquiry into electricity competition known as the Hilmer Report, which subsequently formed the basis for the National Competition Policy (NPC). The Hilmer Report considered competition in terms of six elements: limiting anti-competitive conduct by firms; reformation of competition restricting legislation; reforming structural change to monopolies; provision of third party access to public facilities; restriction of monopoly pricing behaviour, and; fostering competitive neutrality between private and government adversaries (Beresford, 2000) . As they stand, the dominant objective of Australian electricity markets is to minimise energy prices to consumers. While this is a sensible objective, it does not adequately incorporate the increasing demand for energy, external costs or energy efficiency on an equal basis with supply cost concerns (Diesendorf, 2007) .
The absence of price mechanisms that recognise major externalities associated with energy use in competitive markets is distortionary. The classic example is when clean energy technologies such as wind turbines, compete in electricity markets with fossil fuel technologies when no value is placed on pollution.
Naturally, private investors are looking to maximise their private economic return. If a market enables participants to impose costs to others unconnected with the investment, the option that exports the most cost is more likely to be profitable. While markets are structured to enable participants to impose costs on others, the cost differential between clean and fossil-fuel technologies is likely to be closed slowly (Fairfield, 2006) . Western Australia is the only state that is not part of the National Electricity Market due to practical reasons of geography (MacGill et al., 2006) . To facilitate an efficient electricity sector, the WA State Government opted to develop a stand-alone electricity market tailored to the unique growth occurring in the state. In recent years, peak electricity demand growth has outstripped generation investment and WA has seen electricity blackouts during summer peak demand. One role of the IMO is to collect and disseminate technical and market data and investment opportunities in the WEM. This revealing information has become a valuable resource to investors and policymakers. The IMO has stated for some time that the insufficient capacity from the small Dampier to Bunbury gas pipeline has inhibited further gas-fired generation investment on the SWIS.
Recently the pipelines Stage 5B pipeline expansion and further extensions have largely overcome this issue, however, restrictions in new gas supplies and recently higher gas prices continue to limit gas-fired investment (Independent Market Operator (Western Australia), 2008a). With the onset of the gas crisis these fuel supply security issues have been exacerbated, although not in the way many would have expected. As around one sixth of the generation capacity in the SWIS is able to run on liquid and gas fuels, the daily percentage contribution of the liquid fuels to SWIS demand increased from between one and six percent to between approximately ten and thirty percent. The increase use of distillate and diesel is likely to result in liquid fuel imports. Interestingly, the gas crisis and the subsequent government calls to reduce energy consumption appears to have had no effect on the operational demand on the SWIS (Independent Market Operator (Western Australia), 2008b).
Outcomes of competitive markets depend strongly on the direct costs faced by competitors. Consequently energy markets are unlikely to deliver a reduction in pollution or improve energy security without special consideration of internalising market distortions and giving them a market value. Distorted prices lead to sub-optimal investments and operating decisions that incur unnecessary long-term costs unless such externalities are taken into account (Outhred et al., 2002) . The continued growth of operational demand over the gas crisis is a clear example of when operational decisions in both the public and private interest are ignored when they have no market value. Another good example of electricity sector markets providing no incentive to invest in essential elements of supply security is the under-investment in network infrastructure.
The disaggregated network utility natural monopoly (Western Power) reported that a great deal of investment in network upgrades were required before substantial generation can be accommodated in the SWIS. Western Power publishes an Annual Planning Report (APR), which includes the status of the SWIS transmission and distribution system. The transmission system is nearing capacity in several locations, predominantly due to new generation capacity requirements and energy flow requirements across the network. While the WEM reduces electricity prices by increasing competition between electricity retailers and generators, the WEM as it stands is unable to provide certainty of where new generation will be built with sufficient time for the network utility to 
Market restructuring policy options
Energy market restructuring is a complex, difficult and recurring processes that has engineering, economic, social, commercial, legal and policy dimensions and takes place within a broad societal context (Outhred, 2007) . Factors to be taken into account when planning energy systems include economic cost, development, energy security, environmental concerns and equity. Governments play an important role in forging policies, bodies and measures that reduce conflict between these areas (MacGill et al., 2006; Peterson and Rose, 2006) . Independent market operators and regulators assist governments can make significant progress when provided with a mandate and sufficient capacity to act on the behalf of the public interest. A range of internalisation tools are available to such bodies, but none provide a complete solution (Eyre, 1997) . Therefore, a mix of policy instrument options is often required to obtain best acceptable outcomes for all stakeholders (Longo and Markandya, 2005) .
Policy option A: Taxes
Energy taxes are a relatively straightforward solution, although in practice there are complications when quantifying damages and differentiating costs on various technologies and fuels. For example, the impact of a simple carbon tax would not recover the external costs of nuclear fuels and technologies, which would be an unmerited advantage for the nuclear industry (Owen, 2004) . The tax revenue would also have to be distributed in a manner that worked actively with the tax, as to not reimburse the industries that caused the external costs in the first place. Taxes are theoretically a preferred option where there are many polluters and where damages are independent of the point source, such as when coal-fired generation particulate emissions exacerbate upper respiratory tract infections (Eyre, 1997; Kjellstrom et al., 2002) .
The worst of any tax imposed on the poorer sections of society would also have to be offset to ensure the tax burden did not disproportionately affect them (Owen, 2004) . It is important for policymakers to keep in mind that increasing the unit prices of energy does not lead to an increase in energy bills when energy is used more efficiently. In the long run, the increased cost of goods and services from the introduction of Pigovian style taxes will tend to increase the relative generation of positive externalities in an economy. For example, a coal price that takes into account negative externalities will stimulate technological advancement in energy resources and efficiency, which reduces coal consumption and its associated negative externalities (Diesendorf, 2007) . Carbon taxes at the international level have been discussed extensively, but it has never been politically acceptable to a wide range of countries. Carbon taxes in various forms have been implemented in Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Owen, 2004) . Sweden is one of few countries that managed to include coal in its carbon tax, but many countries continue to subsidise coal production (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . A carbon tax in Australia is extremely unlikely in the current economic conditions and the energy intensiveness of much domestic production and consumption.
Policy option B: Subsidies
Where taxing polluters is deemed to be politically unacceptable, targeting grants and subsidies towards clean energy technologies is one option (Owen, 2004) . In recent times, subsidies have been the preferred instrument for Australian domestic energy policy. Policymakers should be aware that governments choosing technology "winners" is always controversial. Governments are not often the appropriate arbiters of determining the technology that is to be supported, as past experience shows that political momentum forming behind ill-advised, technology specific initiatives that stifle superior technological options, can become politically difficult to stop (Jaffe et al., 2005) . One future example of this form of "lock-in" may be the current corn-based ethanol subsidies in the USA.
Subsidising cleaner alternatives can reduce external costs, but will not internalise them (Eyre, 1997) . Nonetheless, subsidies given to clean energy industries should, in theory, have an overall positive impact on the job market by creating more jobs than conventional technologies (Longo and Markandya, 2005; Diesendorf, 2007) . Many clean technologies require increases in the skilled domestic labour force per unit of energy output. This is the case in Australia as clean technologies often contain more domestic content than the majority of imported conventional energy system components (Diesendorf, 2007) . In addition to rebates, another method used to increase uptake of zero pollution technologies are feed-in tariffs. A feed-in tariff (FiT) involves an obligation on the part of energy suppliers to purchase electricity produced by particular technologies and/or accredited producers at a specified price guaranteed for a period of time, generally 15-20 years (Longo and Markandya, 2005; Diesendorf, 2007) . FiTs and competitive bidding processes result in an external cost minimisation, but as they do include subsidies, they can entail significant fiscal and administration costs. Nonetheless, international experience with FiTs have shown that this instrument has effectively diffused new technologies into energy supply systems (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . In Australia, several states and The ACT scheme pays 3.88 times the domestic electricity price for photovoltaic systems that are equal to or less than 10kVA, 3.104 times for systems greater than 10kVA up to 30kVA, and 2.91 times for systems larger than 30kVA (The Legislative Assembly for the Australian Capital Territory, 2008). WA has no
FiT to date, although the newly elected government has indicated in-principal support for a WA FiT scheme.
One significant advantage of FiTs is the certainty it gives to investors (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . If investors can determine the output of an energy system and receive a government guaranteed price for each unit of energy exported to energy markets, they simply find it easier to obtain capital funds and the investment becomes low risk. FiTs would also complement the Australian policymaker preference to subsidise the capital costs of clean energy system components (Diesendorf, 2007) .
Policy Option C: Certificates
Green energy certificates (or credits) are entities that give electricity retailers more flexibility when regulation imposes a minimum requirement of a percentage of total electricity sold to be sourced from renewable energy capacity. These cross-subsidies are commonly funded by either all electricity consumers, the taxpayer, or by individuals voluntarily paying higher unit prices for "green electricity" (Longo and Markandya, 2005; Diesendorf, 2007) .
Producers of accredited green electricity are allocated green certificates to sell, which improves the economics of clean generation investments. These certificates allow clean generators to compete in markets with polluting technologies that externalise their pollution costs. Such schemes effectively reward clean energy producers for not producing external costs (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . In Australia, the Renewable Energy ( GreenPower is another mechanism that operates in Australia and is available in Western Australia. GreenPower works alongside the MRET and allows greater flexibility in transferring RECs to clean energy markets, such as carbon offsetting companies. These certificates do not internalise the social and environmental costs of energy production, but do subsidise socially and environmentally benign technologies (Owen, 2004) . The main tasks required of governments in the trading of green certificates is to fix the quota and provide long-term goals for clean energy use and provide the often considerable investment required to verifying certificates and accrediting generators (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . These schemes are attractive to governments as they can be justified as reducing the levels of external costs imposed on the community, while being more palatable than a tax (Owen, 2004) . Green electricity schemes are attracting an increasing number of subscribers in Australia. Although their fatal flaw is most consumers are unwilling to pay higher prices to secure public goods from which everyone can benefit (Longo and Markandya, 2005) .
Option D: Emission trading
Emissions trading has recently been proposed as the "central instrument of
Australian mitigation" in the draft Garnaut report, released in June 2008 (Garnaut, 2008) . Emission trading schemes involves setting a target of permitted emissions, allocation permits to pollution producers, choosing an amount of permits appropriate to a target, and mandating producers to acquire enough permits to cover their emissions (Diesendorf, 2007) . Legislation usually forms the basis for emitter compliance and is generally mandatory with penalties for non-compliance (Owen, 2004 ). An emission permit is a transferable permit for emitting a specific quantity of pollution into the atmosphere for a specified duration. Producers either purchase or are allocated such permits and thereafter are able to trade these with other firms or surrender them for pollution produced. Firms investing in pollution reduction processes and technologies are able to trade more permits and recover some of the costs of the investment in efficiency (Nenkova, 2005) . There are a variety of forms of emission trading schemes, including "cap and trade", "baseline and credit" as well as variations where permits can be allocated to individuals and/or large emitters. The nuances of these variants are arguably less politically important than the method that pollution permits are allocated in a trading scheme.
In a tradable emission permit approach, the allocation of permits among industries is often the subject of controversy, as the two methods, grandfathering and auctioning, have very different abatement costs to the polluter. Grandfathering on the basis of the historical output means the polluter receives permits equivalent to their emissions for free and must only pay the abatements cost. On the other hand the alternative of auctioning permits forces polluters to pay the cost of abatement at a new emission level (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . From a policymakers perspective, grandfathering provides greater political control over the effects to particular industries, while auctions reduce politically contentious arguments surrounding lobby groups, allows greater flexibility in cost distribution and gives greater incentives for new market entrants and technological innovation (Longo and Markandya, 2005; Diesendorf, 2007; Garnaut, 2008) . Auctioning emission permits also minimise costs to governments (Longo and Markandya, 2005; Commonwealth Government of Australia, 2008; Garnaut, 2008) . A combination of grandfathering and auctioning is one means of conciliation, with one or the other being phased out over time.
Emission trading is regarded as efficient because it combines the advantage of flexibility and efficiency free markets while having a level of certainty of the reduction or final emission level (MacGill et al., 2006; Commonwealth Government of Australia, 2008; Garnaut, 2008) . In reality, it may be difficult for policymakers to predict how wide-ranging market-based instruments may interact with other existing policy measures (MacGill et al., 2006; Garnaut, 2008) . In light of the mixed phase I progress in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, it is likely to be difficult to determine if an Australian domestic scheme will effectively reduce emissions beyond business as usual.
Option E: Informative measures & voluntary agreements
Governments can influence the actions of households and firms by utilising advertising campaigns, environmental labelling, demonstration projects and by facilitating environmental initiatives (Owen, 2004) . Other less common approaches in Australia that are available to WA policymakers are generation disclosure legislation. Generation disclosure refers to the requirement of utilities to provide their customers with additional information about the energy they are supplying. This can include a number of useful indicators, such as fuel mix percentages and emission statistics (Longo and Markandya, 2005) .
A new class of semi-informative measure, voluntary agreements are often referred to as an economic instrument. These instruments include commitments made by individual companies as a result of negotiations with public authorities.
They have a potency to influence behaviour that lies between informative measures and economic instruments. It is often argued that voluntary approaches are unproductive for policymakers as they often do not produce significant results, with firms choosing easy to reach targets that reflect "business as usual" trends of increasing efficiency for financial reasons (Longo and Markandya, 2005; Diesendorf, 2007 
Words of caution for the policymaker
There is no single policy instrument to internalise all externalities or market distortions and a range of policy instruments are often needed in regions such as Western Australia (Eyre, 1997) . Whatever array of instruments are chosen by policymakers, it must be made clear that market-compatible approaches should be used to incorporate economic social and environmental externalities and market distortions (Outhred et al., 2002) . A policymaker must carefully consider the consequences that instruments will have on the economy and carefully consider who will finally pay for the externality (Garnaut, 2008) . The most efficient mechanism is not always the most economically equitable. An increase in production costs are likely to be passed on to consumers, who will bear the burden of the externality (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . Market-based approaches provide incentives for parties with vested interests to influence market designs that provide a competitive advantage to them. Policymakers should not be surprised when firms explore weaknesses to exploit when seeking to minimise the costs of meeting their obligations: the greater the complexity of policies, the greater the likelihood that a weakness exists (MacGill et al., 2006) .
Proponents of the established energy system often attempt to block the diffusion of competitive technologies by influencing the institutional framework so they retain the competitive advantage (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2003) . This may make business sense to individual firms, but will be to the detriment of the market and will likely introduce unnecessary complexity into the policy. A good example is the common argument against including negative externalities as it may harm international competitiveness. There are a number of remedies for this instance, including: wholesale exemptions; negotiated agreements; offsetting tax deduction and financial incentives for energy efficiency improvements, and; border tax adjustments. Border tax adjustments on exports work in a similar manner to the Australian Goods and Services Tax (GST). A full rebate is payed to the exporter to offset the increases in production costs caused by internalising externalities domestically. Goods sold domestically would not receive the adjustment payment (Diesendorf, 2007) .
Attention should focus on polices and instruments that assist system innovation and manages interfaces between potential partners, rather than the common Australian approach of unfairly supporting individual companies (Longo and Markandya, 2005) . The policymaker should be aware of the reasons why economists prefer fair and competitive market structures. Open and competitive markets: efficiently distribute resources; self-correct; stimulate research and development; produce elastically, and; allow access to any party that wants to enter the market (Diesendorf, 2007) .
One key driver of policy development must be that measures actually drive change. There are moral hazards for market designers as there is the potential to design market measures that free-ride on pre-existing policy measures. If the targeted outcomes will likely happen in the absence of the measure, there is little point (MacGill et al., 2006) . The systematic long-term evaluation of policies will also improve the chance of developing a solid empirical base for policies that maximise the returns to the community and minimise economic inefficiencies. Policy experimentation should logically work hand-in-hand with systematic policy evaluation, even though the evaluation of policies can be difficult in practice and may undermine political support for such programmes.
Policymakers should be aware that particular methods of policy evaluation can exaggerate or underestimate the more intangible benefits of policies, such as social impacts (Jaffe et al., 2005) . However, not attempting to evaluate policies at all will simply perpetuate ignorance and leave policymakers vulnerable.
Conclusion
Globally, policy analyses have increasingly focused on the effects of negative externalities on human health, environmental quality, economic development, or institutional objectives such as emissions growth management (Peterson and Rose, 2006) . Providing regional certainty for private industry and the community in places similar to Western Australia is necessary to maintain economic prosperity into the medium to long-term. There is growing pressure on policymakers to comprehend the complicated worlds of economic reform and energy markets to make decisions regarding the future energy supply systems we choose to construct. Economic efficiency is crucial for good energy policies because the energy sector represents a huge capital investment. Any small inefficiency can send considerable repercussions throughout the economy.
With energy reform sitting squarely within the milieu of climate policy, there is a logic to internalising negative externalities in the course of existing energy market evolution. 
